In April 1887 Peirce moved with his second wife, Juliette,
from New York City to Milford, Pennsylvania, a small
resort town in the upper Poconos. A year and a half
later the Peirces moved into a farmhouse two miles
northeast of Milford in the direction of Port Jervis,
New York. This was to become Peirce's Arisbe, named
for a Greek town south of the Hellespont, a colony
of Miletus, home of the first philosophers of Greece.
(1)
The renovation and expansion of the Arisbe house would
often preoccupy Peirce during his remaining years.
The architectural work of remodeling Arisbe, always
with an eye for something vast, would become a living
metaphor for his intellectual life.(2)
Starting in the mid-80s with his "Guess at the
Riddle," Peirce began to gather his philosophical
doctrines together into an integrated system of thought,
and with his 1891 Monist article, "Architecture
of Theories," he began to attend explicitly to
the structural integrity of his system as a whole.
One of Peirce's main efforts after 1890 was to reestablish
pragmatism, not attended to since his 1877-78 "Illustrations,"
as an integral component of his systematic philosophy.
The integrating structure for his mature philosophy
would be a much expanded, though never fully completed,
theory of signs. Also prominent in Peirce's later writings
is a more dominating form of naturalism that ties the
development of human reason unambiguously to natural
evolution and that takes on clear religious overtones.
The introduction printed in volume 1 (EP1) is the general
introduction for The Essential Peirce as a whole, but
no attempt was made to represent Peirce's intellectual
development during his last two decades. This special
introduction to volume 2 (EP2) is intended to supplement
the general introduction by providing a sketch of this
period. Peirce's life continues to resist easy characterizationunless
cryptically in the claim that he embodied the general
maxim he extolled in his fourth Harvard Lecture (sel.
13): "Never say die." There is no doubt that
his life was one of much suffering and many defeats,
but he never for long lost sight of his purpose: to
do what he could to advance human understanding. He
knew his own powers, and he knew the mundane truth
that knowledge is advanced through scholarly preparedness,
insight, humility, and hard intellectual work; and
it was no delusion of grandeur for him to realize that
he was poised to make contributions no one else could
make. The story of Peirce's struggle to redeem his
talents is one of the great personal tragedies of our
time, but it cannot be told here.(3) These remarks are
intended only to provide a unifying structure for the
writings in this collection and a vantage point for
surveying the grand expanse of a remarkably rich and
complicated mind.
One obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of Peirce's
thought is the broad range of his intellectual achievements,
covering so many of the human and physical sciences;
but added to that is the difficulty of determining
to what extent he was influenced by his predecessors
and peers. Of course, no one can think in a vacuumthought
must necessarily relate to past thought, just as it
must appeal to subsequent thoughtso it is never cogent
to ask about any thinker whether his or her thought
was influenced by previous thinkers, but only how and
to what extent. To Peirce, this was obvious. Given
his upbringing among mathematicians and experimental
scientists he learned early that intellectual progress
is always relative to knowledge already gained and
that any successful science must be a cooperative endeavor.
One of the reasons Peirce is so important for the history
of ideas is that he approached philosophy in this way,
knowing that if philosophy was ever really to amount
to anything it would have to abandon the notion that
great ideas arise ex nihilothat one's ideas are wholly
one's own. As a result of this understanding, and of
his desire to help move philosophy toward a more mature
stage of development, Peirce became a diligent student
of the history of ideas and sought to connect his thought
with the intellectual currents of the past. He also
studied carefully the leading ideas of his own time.
His debts are extensivefar too numerous to be cataloged
fully herebut it could not be too far wrong to say
that Aristotle and Kant were his most influential predecessors,
with Plato, Scotus, and perhaps Berkeley coming next,
although only on the heels of many others such as Leibniz,
Hegel, and Comte. With respect to Peirce's scientific,
mathematical, or logical ideas, others have to be added,
including, certainly, De Morgan and Boole. When one
considers how Peirce's thought was influenced by the
ideas of his contemporaries one is hard-pressed to
settle on a short list. Peirce was very current in
many fields of study, due both to his scientifically
informed approach and to the fact that he wrote hundreds
of book reviews and newspaper reports on scientific
meetings and "picked up" ideas along the
way. In logic and mathematics, and even in philosophy,
aside from predecessors, the influence of Cayley, Sylvester,
Schröder, Kempe, Klein, and especially Cantor
stands out. Peirce was also responsive to the writings
of his fellow-pragmatists, among whom he included Josiah
Royce; but he was more influenced by William James
than by any other contemporary. Other contemporaries
of note were the philosopher and editor, Paul Carus,
and the English semiotician, Victoria Lady Welby, whose
work on signs ("significs") led her to Peirce,
and whose attentive interest in his semiotic ideas
encouraged him to develop his theory of signs more
fully than he would have without her.
Paul Carus (1852-1919) is a special case. Carus, a student
of Hermann Grassmann, has been surprisingly neglected
by historians, given his remarkable output as a philosopher
and his importance as an editor and critic. He wrote
scores of books and hundreds of articles (not only
on philosophy) and edited over one hundred issues of
the Monist and over seven hundred issues of the Open
Court, the two periodical publications of the Open
Court Publishing Company.(4)
Open Court authors included
the classic American quartet, Peirce, James, Royce,
and Dewey, and a host of others ranging from Ernst
Mach and Bertrand Russell to D. T. Suzuki. Carus was
a confirmed monist, as is revealed in the name of his
journal, and devoted to the reconciliation of science
and religion. He took a special interest in Peirce
and for over twenty years, notwithstanding some periods
of acrimony, he did more to promote Peirce's philosophy
than anyone. Beginning in 1891, Carus published nineteen
of Peirce's articles (thirteen in The Monist and six
in The Open Court) and many of Peirce's unpublished
writings were intended for Carus. The important role
played by Carus in Peirce's later life, in particular
the fact that after 1890 Peirce wrote most of his best
work for the Monist, is what led Max Fisch to call
that time Peirce's Monist period.
The writings in the present volume begin in 1893 when
Peirce was fifty-four years old, only three years into
the Monist period and one year after his forced resignation
from the Coast and Geodetic Survey. He had recently
delivered a course of lectures on "The History
of Science" at the Lowell Institute in Cambridge
and was just bringing to a closeone article prematurelyhis
influential metaphysical series for the Monist (EP1,
sels. 21-25). He was at work on "Search for a
Method," which was to include a substantially
revised version of his 1877-78 "Illustrations
of the Logic of Science" (EP1, sels. 7-12), and
was about to announce a twelve-volume opus, The Principles
of Philosophy, possibly inspired by James's recent
success with his Principles of Psychology. Clearly,
the opening writings of the present volume arose in
the context of an active and ongoing program of research.
For an intellectual profile of EP2, the separate headnotes
to the selections might be read consecutively. Although
they were not composed to provide a continuous flow
of text, they do give an idea of a thread of intellectual
development that ties together the writings in this
volume. Obviously it is not possible to capture rich
full texts, as most of Peirce's are, in short notes,
but sometimes a single strand of connected meaning
is all that is needed to precipitate more substantial
linkings. Building on the headnotes, bearing in mind
some of the biographical structures developed in the
general introduction in EP1, and also some of the more
significant intellectual events of this later period,
the following sketch emerges as one way to trace Peirce's
development.
In the first selection, "Immortality in the Light
of Synechism," written in 1893, Peirce gave an
indication of the significance of the argument for
continuity that he had planned for a conclusion to
his Monist metaphysical series. "I carry the doctrine
so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole
domain of experience in every element of it. Accordingly,
every proposition, except so far as it relates to an
unattainable limit of experience (which I call the
Absolute), is to be taken with an indefinite qualification;
for a proposition which has no relation whatever to
experience is devoid of all meaning." Synechism
would guide Peirce's philosophical investigations for
the rest of his life. Peirce also signaled his growing
conviction that science and religion were closely allied
at some deep level.
The following year, in "What is a Sign?" (sel.
2), Peirce explored the relationship between logic
and semioticseven equating reasoning with semiosis.
"What is a Sign" is taken from Peirce's unpublished
book "How to Reason," also known as "Grand
Logic." Elsewhere in that work, Peirce revived
the nominalism-realism issue, which he had not dealt
with since 1871, and he identified himself, for the
first time, as an "extreme" realist.(5)
Another year later, in "Of Reasoning in General"
(sel. 3), he further developed his semiotic theory
of logic elaborating more fully his theory that propositions
must always involve two signs, one iconic and the other
indexical. These ideas, along with the idea that our
success in discovering natural laws is explained by
our affinity with nature, would reemerge as key conceptions
in Peirce's struggle to rework pragmatism and to account
for non-rational human insight. But for a time, he
would submerge himself in writing a mathematical textbook
called "New Elements of Mathematics,"(6) and
also in formal logic, particularly in some elaborate
reviews of the recently published volumes of Ernst
Schröder's Vorlesungen über die Algebra der
Logik.(7)
Near the end of 1896 Peirce took what Max Fisch calls
his "most decisive single step" in his progress
toward an all-encompassing realism: he accepted "the
possible" as a "positive universe" and
rejected the nominalist view that the possible is merely
what we do not know not to be true.(8) Peirce reported
this change of mind in January 1897 in his second Schröder
review (CP 3.527) and on 18 March wrote to James that
he had "reached this truth by studying the question
of possible grades of multitude, where I found myself
arrested until I could form a whole logic of possibility"
(CP 8.308). With his acceptance of real possibilitieswhich
put Peirce in the Aristotelian wing of the realist
campPeirce had become what Fisch called "a three-category
realist," no longer regarding the potential as
what the actual makes it to be, and now distinguishing
the generality of firsts from the generality of thirds.
Peirce's embrace of what he would come to call "would-be's"
marks a watershed that might be said to separate his
middle years from the final period of his intellectual
life. This change, in conjunction with his attention
to the importance of continuity, would motivate much
of the content of his 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures.
However, the two lectures from that set that are included
in the present volume (sels. 4 and 5) were perhaps
shaped more by another event: the 1897 appearance of
William James's book, The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy. James had dedicated that
book "To my old friend, Charles Sanders Peirce,
to whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to
whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement
and help than I can express or repay." Peirce
was touched, and on 13 March wrote a reflective letter
to James expressing his appreciation ("it was
a truly sweet thing, my dear William"), and pointing
out some ways his thinking had been affected by his
experience of "the world of misery" which
had been disclosed to him. Although rating "higher
than ever the individual deed as the only real meaning
there is [in] the Concept," he had come to see
"more sharply than ever that it is not the mere
arbitrary force in the deed but the life it gives to
the idea that is valuable." It is not to "mere
action as brute exercise of strength" that we
should look if we want to find purpose. Peirce praised
James's opening essay, "The Will to Believe,"
especially for its style and lucidity, but he clearly
had reservations. James introduced his essay as an
illustration of the continuing concern at Harvard for
"vital subjects": it is "a defence of
our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious
matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical
intellect may not have been coerced."(9) A key point
is that "our non-intellectual nature" influences
our convictions. "Our passional nature,"
James wrote, "not only lawfully may, but must,
decide an option between propositions, whenever it
is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided
on intellectual grounds." It seems evident that
in his Cambridge Conferences Lectures Peirce's great
interest in the tensions between theory and practice,
and his advocacy of "the will to learn" as
a prerequisite to actually learning, were stimulated
by James's "The Will to Believe." It is noteworthy
that from at least that time on, the role of instinct,
or sentiment, as a co-participant with reason in the
acquisition of knowledge became a key concern for Peirce,
and it would not be long until he came to regard ethics
and esthetics as epistemically more fundamental than
logic.
Less than six months after hearing Peirce's lectures
in 1898, William James traveled to California to address
(on 26 August) the Philosophical Union at Berkeley.(10)
It was in that lecture, entitled "Philosophical
Conceptions and Practical Results," that James
publicly introduced the word "Pragmatism." (11)
James told his auditors that he would have preferred
the name "Practicalism" but that he had settled
on "Pragmatism" because that was the name
Peirce had used in the early 1870s when he first advocated
for pragmatism before the Cambridge Metaphysical Club.(12)
James was by this time one of America's most respected
intellectuals and his message fell on fertile ground;
before long there were a host of pragmatists in the
U.S. and abroad. James's acknowledgment of Peirce as
the originator of pragmatism increased Peirce's prominence
and opened for him an opportunity to bring his distinct
views into the growing international debate.(13)
Peirce's second wave of interest in pragmatism is often
thought to have started with James's California lecture,
but it would be more accurate to say that it began
in the early 1890s with the resumption of his research
in logic and methodology for his "Critic of Arguments"
series for the Open Court, and for his books, "Search
for a Method" and "How to Reason." If
anything, James's 1890 Principles of Psychology, especially
the treatment of the role of inference in perception,
probably had more to do with Peirce's return to pragmatism.
But it was also about 1890 when Peirce accepted the
reality of actuality, or secondness, and then saw clearly
that the individual is to be distinguished from the
general. It may have been the logical ramifications
of that large step toward a more embracing realism,
precipitated by his recognition in the mid-80s of the
need for both icons and indices for meaningful reference,
that led Peirce to begin to rethink the argument of
his 1877-78 "Illustrations." Nevertheless,
it surely was the increasing popularity of pragmatism
that James had spawned in 1898 that led Peirce to resolve
to produce a proof that would distinguish his version
of pragmatism from popular versions and sanction his
as the "scientific" one.
The nineteenth century, after his Cambridge Conferences
Lectures, came to a bad ending for Peirce. Between
periods of illness and failures to land employment
Peirce must have learned more about misery.(14) But he
continued to make intellectual progress. On 17 August
1899 he wrote to Carus that "the true nature of
continuity . . . is now quite clear to me." Previously
Peirce had been "dominated by Cantor's point of
view" and had dismissed Kant's definition unjustly.
Now he saw that it is best not to try "to build
up a continuum from points as Cantor does."(15)
He began the twentieth century thinking about great
men of science. On 12 January 1901 he published "The
Century's Great Men in Science" in the New York
Evening Post, noting that "the glory of the nineteenth
century has been its science" and asking what
it was that has distinguished its great contributors.(16)
"Their distinctive characteristic throughout the
century, and more and more so in each succeeding generation,
has been devotion to the pursuit of truth for truth's
sake." He reflected on his own boyhood in Cambridge
and on the leaders of the "scientific generation
of Darwin," most of whom had passed through his
home: "The word science was one often in those
men's mouths, and I am quite sure they did not mean
by it 'systematized knowledge,' as former ages had
defined it, nor anything set down in a book, but, on
the contrary, a mode of life; not knowledge, but the
devoted, well-considered life-pursuit of knowledge;
devotion to Truthnot 'devotion to truth as one sees
it,' for that is no devotion to truth at all, but only
to partyno, far from that, devotion to the truth that
the man is not yet able to see but is striving to obtain."
As Peirce's career opportunities dried up he came more
and more to regard science and philosophy as devout
pursuits.
Fortunately for Peirce, near the end of 1900 James Mark
Baldwin hired him to finish the logic definitions after
"J" for his Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology. This work occupied much of Peirce's time
in 1901, yet he managed to publish about twenty book
reviews and to translate seven articles for the Smithsonian.
One of the books Peirce reviewed in 1901 was Karl Pearson's
Grammar of Science (sel. 6). An idea Peirce had put
forward in his Cambridge Conferences Lectures, that
it is illogical to make one's personal well-being "a
matter of overwhelming moment," can be seen to
be at work in this review. Peirce objected to Pearson's
claim that human conduct should be regulated by Darwinian
theory and that social stability is the sole justification
of scientific research. The human affinity with nature
that Peirce had earlier appealed to to explain our
success in discovering natural laws (sel. 3), was here
explained as resulting from the fact that the human
intellect is an outgrowth of the rationality inherent
in nature. This was a further rejection of nominalism,
which holds that the rationality in nature arises in
human reason. Peirce also rejected Pearson's claim
that there are first impressions of sense that serve
as the starting point for reasoning, and argues that
reasoning begins in percepts, which are products of
psychical operations involving three kinds of elements:
qualities of feelings, reactions, and generalizing
elements.
In 1901 in "Laws of Nature" (sel. 7), Peirce
reviewed different conceptions of natural law and argued
that the typical conception of scientists is that a
law of nature is an objective fact"much more
reliable than any single observation." In remarking
on the method scientists employ in their "exhumation"
of laws of nature, he briefly described a method of
conjecture and testing that he would develop in the
following selection, "On the Logic of Drawing
History from Ancient Documents." In selection
8, Peirce gave one of his most elaborate accounts of
the different kinds of reasoning. He drew a distinction
between two kinds of deductive reasoning, corollarial,
which draws only those conclusions that can be derived
from the analysis and manipulation of the premisses
as given, and theorematic, which enriches the inference
base by adding propositions which were not part of
the original premiss setand "which the thesis
of the theorem does not contemplate" (p. 96).
Peirce believed this distinction to be the most important
division of deductions, and his most important discovery
in the logic of mathematics.(17) He also introduced the
crucial point he would elaborate in his 1903 Harvard
Lectures that "logical criticism cannot go behind
perceptual facts"the "first judgments which
we make concerning percepts." Logic cannot criticize
involuntary processes. Yet these "first judgments"
do represent their percepts, although "in a very
meager way."
By mid-1901 Peirce was ready to draw together the many
interesting and diverse results he had been achieving
into a major book project. The book was to be on logic,
but in addition to reflecting his findings on continuity
and modality, and his excitement with his progress
on a graphical syntax for formal logic, he would incorporate
his new discoveries in semiotics and reflect his growing
belief that logic is a normative science. The book
would be called "Minute Logic" to reflect
the minute thoroughness with which he planned to examine
every relevant problem. An early draft of the first
chapter (MS 425) began with a section entitled "Logic's
Promises" and the opening sentence: "Begin,
if you will, by calling logic the theory of the conditions
which determine reasonings to be secure." Within
a year Peirce had drafted and redrafted hundreds of
pages, and had finished four large chapters.(18) In July
1902 he prepared an elaborate application asking the
Carnegie Institution, presided over by Daniel C. Gilman,
to fund his "Logic" which he had reconceived
as a set of thirty-six memoirs. His application ran
to forty-five pages in typescript, and remains the
best single guide to Peirce's system of thought.(19)
Even though Peirce received strong recommendations
from a powerful group of supporters, including the
President, Theodore Roosevelt, and Andrew Carnegie
himself, his project was not funded. On 19 June 1903
Peirce's brother, James Mills (Jem) wrote to William
James: "Nobody who is familiar with the history
of this affair can doubt that the refusal of the Committee
is due to determined personal hostility on the part
of certain members of the Committee." The matter
had dragged on for so long, though, that by the time
the rejection was definite, Peirce had already given
his 1903 Harvard Lectures and was preparing for his
Lowell Institute serieshe would never return to his
"Minute Logic." Jem wrote to James again
on 23 June about the injustice of the Carnegie decision
and thanked James for securing the Harvard Lectures
for Charles: "I consider that the set of lectures
given this Spring at Cambridge and the promise of the
Lowell Lectures have saved him from going to ruin.
For his fortunes were so desperate, that he could not
much longer have resisted forces tending to destroy
his bodily health and break down his mind."
The part of the "Minute Logic" included in
EP2 is an excerpt from a chapter on the classification
of the sciences. In "On Science and Natural Classes"
(sel. 9), Peirce described a "natural class"
as one "whose members are the sole offspring and
vehicles of one idea," and he explained how ideas
can "confer existence upon the individual members
of the class"not by bringing them into material
existence, but by conferring on them "the power
of working out results in this world." Such ideas,
Peirce says, when not embodied have a "potential
being, a being in futuro." This is Peirce's account
of final causation, the power that ideas have "of
finding or creating their vehicles, and having found
them, of conferring upon them the ability to transform
the face of the earth." Such is the power, Peirce
believes, of the ideas of Truth and Right. It is in
this context that he quotes the famous line from William
Cullen Bryant, "Truth, crushed to earth, shall
rise again."
In following out this thread of connecting ideas we
come to what is probably the single most significant
time in Peirce's mature life of ideas, his time in
Cambridge in 1903 when he gave his famous "Harvard
Lectures," just referred to above, followed not
long after by his third series of Lowell Lectures.
Peirce had paid close attention to the stream of writings
on pragmatism that was gaining momentum and he thought
the time had come for him to make a case for a more
or less definitive core statement. But making his case
or, as he saw it, proving his thesis, was a complicated
matter requiring the marshaling of support from all
areas of his vast system of thought. Further complicating
matters was the fact that Peirce's system had gone
through many changes since the 1870s. Among the more
significant of those changes, some already mentioned
above, was his acceptance of the reality of actuality
(secondness) and later of possibility (firstness);
his realization that human rationality is continuous
with an immanent rationality in the natural cosmos;
and his new-found conviction that logic is a normative
science, epistemically dependent on ethics and esthetics.
For Peirce, pragmatism had become a doctrine that conceptions
are fundamentally relative to aims rather than to action
per se as he had held in earlier years. To prove pragmatism,
then, called for a basic rethinking within the context
of a transformed, and still growing, philosophy. That
was the task Peirce set out to perform in his 1903
Harvard and Lowell Lectures, and the program he inaugurated
that year would guide him for the rest of his life.
In his Harvard Lectures, Peirce built his case for pragmatism
on a new theory of perception, grounded in his theory
of categories and on results from phenomenology, esthetics,
and ethics (sel. 10). He argued that there is a realm
of reality associated with each category and that the
reality of thirdness is necessary to explain a mode
of influence on external facts that cannot be explained
by mechanical action alone (sel. 11). He argued that
pragmatism is a logical, or semiotic, thesis concerning
the meaning of a particular kind of symbol, the proposition,
and explained that propositions are signs that must
refer to their objects in two ways: indexically, by
means of subjects, and iconically, by means of predicates
(sel. 12). The crucial element of Peirce's argument,
from the standpoint of his realism, involved the connection
between propositional thought and perception. To preserve
his realism, Peirce distinguished percepts, which are
not propositional, from perceptual judgments, which
are propositional, and which are, furthermore, the
"first premisses" of all our reasonings.
The process by which perceptual judgments arise from
percepts became a key factor in Peirce's case (sel.
13). But if perceptual judgments are the starting points
for all intellectual development, then we must be able
to perceive generality (sel. 14). Peirce next argued
that abduction shades into perception, so that pragmatism
may be regarded as the logic of abduction, and, finally,
isolated three key points: that nothing is in the intellect
that is not first in the senses; that perceptual judgments
contain general elements; and that abductive inference
shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line
of demarcation (sel. 15). Pragmatism, Peirce showed,
follows from these propositions (sel. 16).
According to Fisch,(20)
it was in the Harvard Lectures
that Peirce, for the first time, made it clear that
his realism was opposed to idealism as well as to nominalism.
Peirce's new theory of perception embraced the doctrine
of immediate perception, to deny which, according to
Peirce, "cuts off all possibility of ever cognizing
a relation." That idea was carried forward into
the Lowell Lectures, where Peirce continued with his
effort to prove pragmatism, making his best attempt
so far, according to Fisch.(21) In "What Makes a
Reasoning Sound" (sel. 17), the only lecture from
the Lowell series that is included in EP2, Peirce made
a strong case for objective grounds for evaluating
reasonings and argued that with the right method even
"a slight tendency to guess correctly" will
assure progress toward the truth.
In conjunction with his Lowell Lectures, Peirce prepared
a "Syllabus" to be distributed to his auditors.
The first part is "An Outline Classification of
the Sciences" (sel. 18), showing the normative
sciencesesthetics, ethics, and logicas constituting
the central part of philosophy, and giving the order
of epistemic and datasupport relationships among the
sciences that will guide his subsequent research. In
"The Ethics of Terminology" (sel. 19), Peirce
paused from his central task to elaborate on an issue
that had been troubling him since he began working
on logic entries in 1900 for Baldwin's Dictionary (and
perhaps earlier with his work for the Century Dictionary):
the unscientific terminology that prevailed in philosophy.
Peirce recognized that philosophy could never abandon
ordinary language altogether, for it is essential to
understanding common conceptions, but philosophical
analysis and progress calls for a specialized vocabulary.
That was Peirce's strong conviction, and it explains
his frequent resort to neologisms.
It may be that the attention Peirce gave to his classification
of the sciences, along with his new-found conviction
that logic is coextensive with semiotics, provided
the impetus for the remaining two parts of the "Syllabus"
that are included in EP2. They introduced a shift to
an intensive development of his theory of signs along
taxonomic lines motivated by his categories. In "Sundry
Logical Conceptions" (sel. 20), Peirce introduced
the semiotic trichotomy that divides signs according
to whether they are interpreted as signs of possibility,
fact, or law: rhemes (here called sumisigns), dicisigns,
and arguments. That trichotomy was additional to his
long-held division of signs according to whether they
represent their objects by virtue of similarity, existential
connection, or law: icons, indices, or symbols. In
"Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations"
(sel. 21), Peirce introduced another trichotomy that
distinguishes signs according to whether, in and of
themselves, they are qualities, existents, or laws:
qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. With these three
trichotomies in place, Peirce was able to identify
ten distinct classes of signs. This was the beginning
of a rapid development of his formal semiotic theory.
There were two other parts of the "Syllabus"
that are not included in EP2, one on Peirce's system
of Existential Graphs, which Peirce would later choose
as the preferred medium for the presentation of his
proof of pragmatism, and the other an in-depth treatment
of dyadic relations parallel to the treatment of triadic
relations found in selection 21.
In the next two selections Peirce shifted his attention
from pragmatism and its proof to concentrate more fully
on the theory of signs. In "New Elements"
(sel. 22), he focused on the abstract mathematical
structures necessarily exhibited by sign relations
and argued, as he had in "On Science and Natural
Classes," that "representations have power
to cause real facts" and that "there can
be no reality which has not the life of a symbol."
And in "Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific
Writing" (sel. 23) Peirce gave one of his most
focused accounts of speculative rhetoric, the third
branch of his semiotic trivium, which has as its aim
to find out "the general secret of rendering signs
effective." Peirce made it clear that the range
of legitimate semiotic effects (interpretants) includes
feelings and physical results, as well as thoughts
and other signs. Peirce reiterated a point he had made
at least as early as his Harvard Lectures, that nothing
can be represented unless it is of the nature of a
sign, and he stressed that ideas can only be communicated
through their physical effects.
While Peirce was writing about semioticsand topics
outside the scope of this volume (e.g., mathematics
and graphical logic)he had not stopped thinking about
pragmatism. On 7 March 1904 he wrote to William James:
"The humanistic element of pragmatism is very
true and important and impressive; but I do not think
that the doctrine can be proved in that way. The present
generation likes to skip proofs. . . . You and Schiller
carry pragmatism too far for me. I don't want to exaggerate
it but keep it within the bounds to which the evidences
of it are limited." By this time he was already
at work on the first article of another series of papers
for the Monist where he would again take up the proof
of pragmatism.
Peirce's third Monist series opened with the April 1905
publication of "What Pragmatism Is" (sel.
24). This was to be the first of three papers that
would explain in detail Peirce's special brand of pragmatism,
give examples of its application, and prove it. Not
long into his paper, Peirce paused to deliver a short
lesson on philosophical nomenclaturethe message being
essentially the same as that of selection 19as a rationale
for renaming his form of pragmatism. He chose the name
"pragmaticism" as one "ugly enough"
to be safe from kidnappers. Peirce lamented that his
word "pragmatism" was now met with in the
literary journals, "where it gets abused in the
merciless way that words have to expect when they fall
into literary clutches." He would continue using
his new "ugly" word for the rest of the Monist
series, and as late at 1909 (sel. 30, p. 457) he used
"pragmaticism" because, he wrote, James and
Schiller had made "pragmatism" imply "the
will to believe, the mutability of truth, the soundness
of Zeno's refutation of motion, and pluralism generally";
but he would often revert to his original name, indicating
that he may not really have wanted to give it up.
After his excursus into philosophical terminology, Peirce
examined the presuppositions of pragmaticism with his
proof in mind. One key assumption was that all mental
development (learning) takes place in the context of
a mass of already formed conceptions, and another was
that meaning is always virtual. He also argued for
the relevance of all three of the categories of being
for his pragmaticism: thought (thirdness) can only
govern through action (secondness) which, in turn,
cannot arise except in feeling (firstness).
The same year, in "Issues of Pragmaticism"
(sel. 25), Peirce restated his pragmatic maxim in semiotic
terms, along lines suggested in his sixth Harvard Lecture
(sel. 15). He identified the meaning that pragmaticism
seeks to enunciate as that of symbols rather than of
simple conceptions. The thrust of this article was
to articulate his forms of critical common-sensism
and scholastic realism, which he regarded as consequences
(or "issues") of pragmaticism. He extended
his realism to include the acceptance of "real
vagues" and "real possibilities," and
he pointed out that "it is the reality of some
possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to
insist upon." According to Fisch, pragmaticism
had now become pragmatism "purged of the nominalistic
dross of its original exposition."(22)
There are a number of manuscript drafts for a third
Monist article which indicate that Peirce intended
to proceed with his proof along lines he would follow
in selection 28. In one of those drafts, "The
Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy" (sel. 26),
he began with an argument from the valency of concepts
based in his phenomenology (phaneroscopy) and theory
of categories. In another, "The Basis of Pragmaticism
in the Normative Sciences" (sel. 27), he focused
on the normative sciences, especially on his general
theory of signs, as the key to the proof. Peirce pointed
out that the pragmaticist will grant that the "summum
bonum" consists in a "continual increase
of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality" but
insisted that without embodiment in something other
than symbols, "the principles of logic show there
never could be the least growth in idea-potentiality."
Around this time, Peirce was working intensely on the
formal structure and systematic interconnections of
semiotic relations. His logic notebook (MS 339) in
1905 and 1906 is rife with semiotic analyses and discoveries
giving weight to the idea that it was in the context
of his theory of signs that he expected to deliver
his promised proof of pragmaticism. But when the third
article of the series, "Prolegomena to an Apology
for Pragmaticism," finally appeared in October
1906, it turned out to be an explication of his system
of logical graphs, the Existential Graphs, instead
of the expected proof. Peirce had decided that it was
by means of the Existential Graphs that he could most
convincingly set out his proof, which was to follow
in subsequent articles (although it is significantly
previewed in this one). Peirce had decided to use his
system of graphs for his proof for three principal
reasons: it employed the fewest possible arbitrary
conventions for representing propositions, its syntax
was iconic, and it facilitated the most complete analysis.
Peirce worked for years on the continuation of this
series, but he never finished it.
It is not known for certain why Peirce was unable to
complete his Existential Graphs-based proof, but it
is often supposed to have been a consequence of his
failure to reach a satisfactory solution to the problem
of continuity.(23) It is clear that Peirce expected his
argument for pragmatism to also constitute a proof
of synechism (see selection 24, p. 335). So it may
have been technical problems involving the logic of
continuity that kept Peirce from completing this series
of papers. Peirce interrupted his efforts to complete
this third Monist series with a separate series on
"amazing mazes" (two articles of a proposed
three were published in 1908-9) in which he developed
applications of the Existential Graphs and worked out
new definitions of continuity.(24) This mathematical
line of thought led Peirce into a number of important
technical questions involving probability and modality.
By February 1909, Peirce had worked out a matrix method
for an extension of the propositional calculus to three
valuesat least ten years before the similar work of
Lukasiewicz and Post.(25) Peirce's acceptance of real
possibility had convinced him that the definition of
"probability" should include reference to
dispositions in addition to frequencies, but even though
he tried many alternatives involving the propensity
view he was never satisfied that he had got it quite
right.(26) For Peirce, this was a matter of considerable
importance for pragmatism, because one of the great
defects he found with his early theory was the nominalistic
appeal to a frequency theory of probability. He also
gave up the material interpretation of logical implication.(27)
Among the more entangled and confounding sets of manuscripts
in the Harvard collection (the manuscripts acquired
by the Harvard Philosophy Department after Peirce's
death) is one from 1906-7 in which Peirce attempted
to compose a more or less popular account of pragmaticismbut
again called "pragmatism"and to give at
least a summary proof (MSS 316-22). Nominally, Peirce
was composing a "letter to the editor," initially
for the Nation but later for the Atlantic, although
Peirce recognized it as a full-fledged article in his
correspondence. In the two variants combined in selection
28, Peirce delivered a proof that is probably the one
he was intending to give in the Monist before he decided
on a more formal approach using his Existential Graphs.
The proof in selection 28 is based on Peirce's theory
of signs, beginning with the premiss that every concept
and every thought beyond immediate perception is a
sign, and concluding with the proposition that a final
logical interpretant must be of the nature of a habit.
This selection provides an illuminating integration
of Peirce's theory of signs, including his mature theories
of propositions and inference, with his pragmaticism.
It is evident from the refinement of the theory of signs
expressed in his remarkable "letter" that
Peirce had not given up work on semiotics when he turned
to his Existential Graphs for his Monist proof of pragmatism.
There may have been a hiatus following his failure
to get his "letter" into print, but by August
1908 he was hard at work on the classification of triadic
relations (MS 339) and in December he resumed discussion
of his theory of signs in correspondence with Lady
Welby (sel. 32). Peirce's letters to Lady Welby record,
often in summary form, the most advanced theory of
signs ever fashioned. The theory as a whole is far
too complex to be represented here, although it was
lightly sketched in the general introduction in EP1,
and a recent book by James Liszka provides an excellent
introduction to the system in full.(28) For the thread
of intellectual development being pursued here, it
is noteworthy that early in 1906 Peirce wrote to Lady
Welby that he had found it necessary to distinguish
two semiotic objects (immediate and dynamical) and
three interpretants (here called "intentional,"
"effectual," and "communicational"),
and he introduced the important conception of the commens,
which "consists of all that is, and must be, well
understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill
its function." On 23 December 1908 Peirce defined
"sign" as "anything which is so determined
by something else, called its Object, and so determines
an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant,
that the latter is thereby mediately determined by
the former." He immediately added that the only
reason he had inserted "upon a person" into
his definition was because he despaired of making his
broader conception understood. Over the course of the
next few days he laid out his "ten main trichotomies
of signs" (eight of them had been quietly given
in a single remarkable paragraph on pp. 402-3 of selection
28), the tenth one being the division that expresses
the three sources of assurance utterances can have:
instinct, experience, or form. This tenth trichotomy
would occupy Peirce a great deal during his remaining
five years. Peirce's correspondence with William James
(sel. 33) repeats many of the same semiotic developments
recorded in the letters to Lady Welby, but sometimes
more perspicuously and always in a different voice.
Modal considerations are more evident in the letters
to James. As pointed out above, by 1909 Peirce had
made deep advances into modal logic and this is reflected
in various ways; for example, in Peirce's emphatic
statement that the final interpretant consists in the
way every mind "would act," not in the way
any mind does act, and also in Peirce's division of
semiotic objects into may-be's, actualities, and would-be's.
On 9 April 1908 Peirce received a letter from Cassius
J. Keyser inviting him to write an article for the
Hibbert Journal. Peirce replied (10 April), outlining
ten alternative topics and asking Keyser to choose
one. Peirce had written, as his third alternative:
"as I believe the Hibbert Journal is favorable
to theological discussion, I should willingly treat
a little known 'proof' of the Being of God. Properly
speaking it is not itself a proof, but is a statement
of what I believe to be a fact, which fact, if true,
shows that a reasonable man by duly weighing certain
great truths will inevitably be led to believe in God."(29)
Whether it was Keyser or Peirce who chose the third
alternative is not clear, but Peirce spent most of
the next three months composing "A Neglected Argument
for the Reality of God" (sel. 29).
In that paper Peirce examined the attractive force of
the idea of God and concluded that humans instinctively
gravitate to it. He contended that belief in God is
irresistible to anyone who naturally (through musement)
comes to contemplate the possibility of God. The "God
hypothesis" appears to be a special kind of abduction
(he uses "retroduction" instead of "abduction"
in this paper). It arises from a human power of guessing
that is analogous to the instincts of animals, and
because it recommends itself with unusual force we
can take "a certain altogether peculiar confidence"
in it as a sign of the truth. Peirce called this his
"humble argument" but pointed out that it
is not a "proof" because the process leading
from the idea of God to belief in God is not a reasoned
(self-controlled) development of ideas. Peirce was
led to make a distinction between "argument"
and "argumentation" that he had not explicitly
made before: an argument is "any process of thought
reasonably tending to produce a definite belief"
while an argumentation is "an argument proceeding
upon definitely formulated premisses." An argument,
in other words, does not have to be self-controlled.
The power of guessing was put forward as "a sort
of divinatory power," what Galileo called il lume
naturale, and appears to have supplanted Ockham's razor
in Peirce's methodological arsenal.
As the conclusion of an "argumentation," the
"God hypothesis" must pass through the three
successive stages of inquiry: retroduction, deduction,
and induction. Peirce devoted nearly half the paper
to a discussion of these three stages, but ended up
giving only the barest sketch of how they apply in
this case. Scientific inquiry requires that any hypothesis
be verified by putting its implications to the test
of actual experience. The difficulty with the "God
hypothesis" is that it is so vagueits object
so "infinitely incomprehensible"that it
seems to be impossible to draw any definite implications
from its supposed truth. This might appear to fall
short of the demands of pragmatism, but, on closer
look, one finds that after Peirce embraced the reality
of possibility he reconceived the idea of "practical
consequences." In his Harvard Lectures he had
emphasized that the maxim of pragmatism reaches far
beyond the merely practical and allows for any "flight
of imagination," provided only that this imagination
"ultimately alights upon a possible practical
effect." The practical effect that Peirce conceived
the "God hypothesis" to "alight upon"
is "the self-controlled growth of man's conduct
of life." Some scholars wonder whether this weakens
the pragmatic maxim beyond recoverywhether, in other
words, this opens the way for reinstating into our
ontologies all sorts of "beings" that Peirce's
earlier pragmatism excludedbut that underscores the
fundamental issue raised by this article: whether belief
can have any value for the self-controlled growth of
the conduct of life if its object is not real.
Peirce's probing of the logic of perception and his
reflections on the effectiveness of religious belief,
probably along with suggestions that arose from his
taxonomic investigations in semiotics, led him in his
last years to devote a great deal of thought to "the
kinds and degrees of assurance that can be afforded
by the different ways of reasoning." The related
theory is what Peirce meant by "logical critics,"
the subject of his intended contribution for a book
to honor Lady Welby. That paper, "A Sketch of
Logical Critics" (sel. 30), is incomplete, but
in the part he finished he made the important point
that by "reasoning" we mean a "change
in thought" that appeals to a relation between
our new cognition (the "conclusion") and
"an already existing cognition" (the premiss
or premisses) to support our assent in the truth of
the conclusion. But not all belief acquisition appeals,
in any deliberate sense, to previous cognition, as
we saw in the case of perceptual judgments and belief
in God. Peirce's conclusion was that knowledge is acquired
in two ways, by reasoning, of course, but also by experience.
Belief acquired through reasoning must be justified
by what preceded it in our minds, but belief gained
through experience needs no justification.
In the final article in EP2, "An Essay Toward Reasoning
in Security and in Uberty" (sel. 31), Peirce carried
further his consideration of the benefits afforded
by the different kinds of reasoningalthough here again
the discussion is left incomplete. This paper, written
in October 1913, only a few months before his death,
might suggest that he was having doubts about the value
of pragmatism. But it would be more accurate to conclude
that in his later years Peirce's thought gravitated
to ideas and concerns that forced himor enabled himto
see the limitations of pragmatism. In 1903 he had proclaimed
Pragmatism to be "a wonderfully efficient instrument
. . . of signal service in every branch of science"
(sel. 10). He had recommended it as advantageous for
the conduct of life. Now he saw that the appeal of
pragmatism was its contribution to the security of
reasoningbut there is a price to pay for security.
According to Peirce, reasoning always involves a trade-off
between security and uberty (rich suggestiveness; potency).
Deductive reasoning provides the most security, but
it is austere and almost entirely without evocative
power. Abduction, on the other hand, is abundant in
its uberty though nearly devoid of security. Peirce
had come to see that pragmatism has the limitations
that come with choosing security over uberty: "[it]
does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral
virtue, or upon abstract truth;the three things that
alone raise Humanity above Animality."
Naturalism had grown into a powerful force in Peirce's
thought. He had come to believe that attunement to
nature was the key to the advancement of knowledgeas
it was for life itselfand he thought that the power
to guess nature's ways was one of the great wonders
of the cosmos. Just as with animals, whose instinct
enables them to "rise far above the general level
of their intelligence" in performing their proper
functions, so it is with humans, whose proper function,
Peirce insisted, is to embody general ideas in art-creations,
in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition.
But if attunement to nature is the key to the advancement
of knowledge, it is at most a necessary condition;
it puts thought on the scent of truth, which, to attain,
must be won by skilled reasoning. Peirce remained a
logician to the end.
This concludes the thread of development chosen here
to draw together the separate papers in EP2, but it
is only one of many approaches that could have been
taken. Peirce's shift to a graphical syntax for his
formal logic, with its corresponding emphasis on the
importance of icons for reasoning, led to remarkable
results in logic and in philosophy that parallels the
course of development outlined above. Alternatively,
the evolution of Peirce's theory of signs that is evident
throughout EP2 might have been more systematically
used to mark movements in Peirce's thought through
these years. Or one might have expanded on Fisch's
account of Peirce's ever-strengthening commitment to
realismor have followed the shifting influence of
major thinkers and scientific discoveries on Peirce's
thought. These and other approaches could be turned
into useful heuristic guides to Peirce's intellectual
life in his final two decades. But the growth of his
pragmatism and, in particular, the development of its
proof, surely represents a strong current running through
the period and for much of it probably best represents
Peirce's leading idea.
Something more should be said about Peirce's proof of
pragmatismone of the great puzzles for Peirce scholars.
Max Fisch characterized it as "elusive" and
Richard Robin says it is "unfinished business."(30)
When he first claimed publicly in 1905 to have a proof
(sel. 24), he said it was "a proof which seems
to the writer to leave no reasonable doubt on the subject."
Elsewhere he called it a "strict proof" or
"scientific proof." We should not accept
the pragmatic maxim, Peirce told the auditors of his
second Harvard Lecture (sel. 11), "until it has
passed through the fire of a drastic analysis."
Peirce literally meant to "prove" pragmatismbut
in the sense called for by philosophy. Philosophical
proofs seek to prove truths, not just theorems (they
strive to be sound, not just valid), and must therefore
be concerned with establishing the truth of their premisses.
Only rarely is the deductive form of a philosophical
argument in dispute; the crucial questions almost always
have to do with the legitimacy and strength of the
premisses. And as with science generally, establishing
the relevance and truth of contingent premisses calls
for non-deductive forms of reasoning. As a result,
proving pragmatism calls for marshaling an appropriate
set of assumptions and supportable claims which, as
premisses, will entail pragmatism as expressed in Peirce's
maxim. In his first Harvard Lecture, to add to the
"strictness" of the proof, Peirce deliberately
expressed his maxim as a theorem: "Pragmatism
is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible
in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused
form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any,
lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical
maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having
its apodosis in the imperative mood." So when
Peirce claimed to have a proof of pragmatism, he meant
that he could produce what he believed to be a convincing
rationale, an argument (or, as he would say in his
"Neglected Argument," an argumentation),
to demonstrate that the pragmatic maxim, in a given
form, strictly follows from a given set of premisses,
and, furthermore, that each of the premisses is either
a common assumption or can otherwise be shown to be
admissible.
When Peirce's efforts to prove pragmatism are understood
to be attempts to provide a convincing rationale or
argument for the truth of his maxim, it makes sense
to suppose that his first proof began to take shape
in the early 1870s when he promoted pragmatism among
the members of the Cambridge Metaphysical Club. His
first published proof, then, would have been the argument
of his "Illustrations." This is the view
expressed by Max Fisch(31) and it is strongly supported
by Peirce himself in his first Harvard Lecture (sel.
10): "The argument upon which I rested the maxim
in my original paper was that belief consists mainly
in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula
believed in as the guide to action." This belief,
in turn, was carried back to "an original impulse
to act consistently, to have a definite intention."
But this is a "psychological principle" and
by 1903 Peirce no longer thought it "satisfactory
to reduce such fundamental things to psychology."
Besides, as he wrote in the "additament"
to his "Neglected Argument" (sel. 29), "I
must confess the argument . . . might with some justice
be said to beg the question." We might think of
this early proof as the proof based on Peirce's theory
of belief.
By 1903 Peirce had devoted a great deal of study to
scientific proofs and to epistemic support relationships
across sciences. By then he was much better prepared
to build a proof of pragmatism, and it is clear that
he was thinking of "proof" in a more rigorous
sense. In his more technical restatement of his maxim
for his Harvard Lectures, pragmatism was restricted
to conceptions that can be expressed in sentential
form. According to the pragmatic maxim, so stated,
the meaning of a theoretical judgment expressible in
a sentence in the indicative mood (what was originally
expressed as "the object of our conception")
lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical
maxim that takes the form of a conditional sentence
(originally, "our conception of effects that might
conceivably have practical bearings"). This is
the thesis Peirce set out in 1903 to demonstrate. How
did he go about it? Roughly by establishing, first,
that all intellectual contents amount to theoretical
judgments expressible in indicative sentences and,
second, that all such judgments fundamentally appeal
to imperative practical conditionals. To support the
first part, he established: (1) nothing is in the intellect
that was not first in the senses, (2) the process by
which sensory stimulation rises to perceptual judgment
is not subject to self-control, (3) perceptual judgments
cannot be called into question and are the first premisses
of all our reasonings, (4) perceptual judgments contain
general (i.e. interpretative) elements (as in predicates
of propositions), and (5) although literally particular,
perceptual judgments entail general propositions. Then
Peirce argued that (6) the process which results in
perceptual judgments is a quasi-abductive process (depending
on intellectual habits) which "interprets"
percepts as cases falling under practical conditionals
(and, therefore in relation to a purpose). This effectively
proved his thesis. We might think of this as Peirce's
proof of pragmatism based on his theory of perception.
In "Pragmatism" (sel. 28), Peirce shifted
the burden of his proof to his theory of signs. He
began by developing his thesis along lines he seemed
to initially have had in mind for his Monist proof
(see selection 26). First he characterized pragmatism
as a method of ascertaining the meaning of "intellectual
concepts" and he noted that "triadic predicates"
are the principal examples (although, in passing, he
considered whether there might be non-intellectual
triadic relations). He noted that while signs can convey
any of three forms of predicates (monadic, dyadic,
or triadic), only triadic predicates are properly called
"intellectual concepts." Only intellectual
concepts convey more than feeling or existential fact,
namely the "would-acts" of habitual behavior;
and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever
completely fill up the meaning of a "would-be."
This line of thought (with many steps left out) led
Peirce to his thesis, what he called "the kernel
of pragmatism" (p. 402): "The total meaning
of the predication of an intellectual concept consists
in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances
of a given kind, the subject of the predication would
(or would not) behave in a certain way,that is, that
it either would, or would not, be true that under given
experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion
of them, taken as they would occur in experience) certain
facts would exist." He also expressed his thesis
in a simpler form: "The whole meaning of an intellectual
predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen,
once in so often, in the course of experience, under
certain kinds of existential circumstances." This
is what Peirce set out to prove in 1907.
Peirce's proof, much abbreviated, ran something like
this:
1. "Every concept and every thought beyond immediate
perception is a sign."
2. The object of a sign is necessarily unexpressed in
the sign.
3. The interpretant is the "total proper effect
of the sign" and this effect may be emotional,
energetic, or logical, but it is the logical interpretant
alone that constitutes "the intellectual apprehension
of the meaning of a sign."
4. "A sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being,
which mediates between an object and an interpretant;
since it is both determined by the object relatively
to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant
in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause
the interpretant to be determined by the object through
the mediation of this 'sign.'"
5. The logical interpretant does not correspond to any
kind of object, but is essentially in a relatively
future tense, what Peirce calls a "would-be."
Thus the logical interpretant must be "general
in its possibilities of reference."
6. Therefore, the logical interpretant is of the nature
of habit.
7. A concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical
interpretant, but not a final logical interpretant.
The habit alone, though it may be a sign in some other
way, does not call for further interpretation. It calls
for action.
8. "The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit
. . . is the living definition, the veritable and final
logical interpretant."
9. "Consequently, the most perfect account of a
concept that words can convey will consist in a description
of that habit which that concept is calculated to produce.
But how otherwise can a habit be described than by
a description of the kind of action to which it gives
rise, with the specification of the conditions and
of the motive?"
This conclusion is virtually a paraphrase of Peirce's
thesis, the "kernel of pragmatism," so it
completes his proof. We might think of this as the
proof from Peirce's theory of signs. On 10 April 1907,
Peirce sent Giovanni Papini a similar, though somewhat
fuller, outline and explained that "among all
scientific proofs with which I am acquainted [this
is] the one that seems to me to come nearest to popular
apprehension."(32)
When Peirce began his third Monist series, represented
in EP2 in selections 24-27, he probably had something
like the above proof in mind, although perhaps something
more wide-ranging. The definition of pragmatism as
set out in "What Pragmatism Is" (sel. 24)
gives some idea of what he was aiming for: pragmatism,
he wrote, is "the theory that a conception, that
is, the rational purport of a word or other expression,
lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the
conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that
might not result from experiment can have any direct
bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately
all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the
affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one
will have therein a complete definition of the concept,
and there is absolutely nothing more in it" (332).
Peirce pointed out that to prove this thesis it would
be necessary to appeal to a wide range of "preliminary
propositions." Don D. Roberts has listed seventeen
"premisses" that he thinks are likely to
be among the ones Peirce had in mind, and these include
"dismiss make-believes," "logical self-control
is a mirror of ethical self-control," "an
experiment is an operation of thought," "we
do not doubt that we can exert a measure of self-control
over our future actions," "a person is not
absolutely individual," and "thinking is
a kind of dialogue."(33)
Midway through his third Monist series, Peirce changed
his mind and decided to base his proof on his Existential
Graphs. He never completed his graph-based proof, but
there are many manuscript pages indicating what he
had in mind. In one draft (MS 298) Peirce explained:
"You 'catch on,' I hope. I mean, you apprehend
in what way the system of Existential Graphs is to
furnish a test of the truth or falsity of Pragmaticism.
Namely, a sufficient study of the Graphs should show
what nature is truly common to all significations of
concepts; whereupon a comparison will show whether
that nature be or be not the very ilk that Pragmaticism
(by the definition of it) avers that it is. . . ."
That proof, as represented in preliminary form in Peirce's
1906 "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"
(CP 4.530-72) and in MSS 296-300, is extremely complex.
It depends heavily on establishing that the system
of Existential Graphs provides a working model of thought
and that experimenting with the Graphs amounts to experimenting
with concepts themselves. The sweep of issues addressed
in the premisses of this proof includes: that the proper
objects for investigation in experiments with diagrams
are forms of relation; that deductive reasoning is
no more certain than inductive reasoning when experimentation
can be "multiplied at will at no more cost than
a summons before the imagination"; that icons
have more to do with the living character of truth
than either symbols or indices; that reasoning must
be chiefly concerned with forms; that diagrams are
icons of the forms of relations that constitute their
objects; that members of a collection, taken singly,
are not as numerous as the relations among them; that
there can be no thought without signs and there are
no isolated signs; that every logical evolution of
thought should be dialogic; and that thought is not
necessarily connected with a brain. This is only a
sampling. There is little doubt that the full exposition
of Peirce's Graphs-based proof would shed considerable
light on the complex network of relationships internal
to Peirce's system of thought that support pragmatism,
but it is not so clear whether its upshot would be
to prove pragmatism or to prove that the system of
Existential Graphs is a valid normative logic of cognitionreally
a "moving picture of thought" as Peirce once
said (CP 4.11).
Most of Peirce's arguments for pragmatism, and there
are a number that have not been mentioned, seem to
be quite straightforward in setting out what is to
be provedthe pragmatic maxim as a carefully stated
thesisand in supplying the assumptions and premisses
that entail that thesis as conclusion. The intractibility
of these arguments usually results from their large
number of premisses, ranging over vast sweeps of Peirce's
system of thought, and from the difficulty involved
in establishing the premisses. But the matter is complicated
by the fact that many of the involved premisses require
inductive support, and by apparent promises of inductive
confirmation for the pragmatic conclusion, which Peirce
thought his readers might hesitate to accept because
of the overall complexity of the argument and the novel
ideas it involved.(34) An important question emerges:
What kind of principle is the pragmatic maxim after
all? Is it a logical maxim and a regulative principle,
or is it a positive truth that can be treated as a
scientific hypothesis calling for inductive confirmation?
Peirce's treatment suggests that it is both. But as
a positive truth informing us how to construe the meaning
of conceptions or propositionssigns with intellectual
valuehow could the pragmatic maxim be confirmed? In
criticizing the argument of his 1877-78 "Illustrations,"
Peirce disallowed any appeal to psychology, and in
any case his classification of the sciences shows that
the only positive sciences that can legitimately be
appealed to are phenomenology and the prior normative
sciences (and parts of logic) on which logical methods
must rely. Peirce thought the maxim could be tested
by using it to analyze familiar intellectual conceptions
such as "real," "identity," "sequence,"
"substance," "time," and "probability,"
but only after he had established that his logical
analyses of those conceptions was neither psychological
nor question-begging. That seems to be why he had first
to prove that working with his Existential Graphs was
"equivalent" to working with conceptions
themselves. His proof from the Existential Graphs,
then, appears to have been integral to his effort to
prove pragmatism inductively. One of the limitations
of this approach is that it can never wield demonstrative
force, and the argument can always be carried further;
but the hope must be that the time will come when further
confirmation is beside the point. It is probably this
inductive approach that has lent support to the view
that Peirce's proof is rather amorphous and perhaps
at best a cable with fibers of independent sub-arguments.
Overall, it is easy to see why Thompson said that a
"real proof" of pragmatism "would amount
to a kind of elucidation of most of Peirce's philosophy
and formal logic" and why Robin said that "coming
to terms with pragmatism's proof" means coming
to terms "with the whole Peirce."(35)
When Peirce died in the spring of 1914 he left a lot
of important work unfinished. Perhaps most to be regretted
is that he was unable to complete his "System
of Logic, Considered as Semeiotic," which he hoped
would stand for realism in the twentieth century as
Mill's System of Logic had stood for nominalism in
the nineteenth.(36) As it was, he did leave far more
than has since been put to good use. More than fifty
years ago, the great American social philosopher, Sidney
Hook, wrote of Peirce that "he is just as much
the philosopher's philosopher [today], just as much
the pioneer of a second Copernican revolution in thought
(one more genuine than Kant's) as he was when his meteoric
genius first flashed across American skies."(37)
It is still true that Peirce is mainly a "philosopher's
philosopher." But it may turn out that his pioneering
work, perhaps especially his later writings so tightly
packed with ideas, will bloom at last into the influential
legacy that Peirce in hopeful moments imagined would
be his bequest to the future. Perhaps this collection,
in spite of its limitations, will contribute to that
end.
Nathan Houser
1. See Max H. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism,
K. L. Ketner and C. J. W. Kloesel, eds. (Indiana University
Press, 1986), pp. 227-48.
2. Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy
(Harvard University Press, 1961; Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1993), p. 3.
3. Peirce's life was long neglected and is still obscure.
The best accounts can be found in: Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic,
and Pragmatism; Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce:
A Life (Indiana University Press, 1993; revised ed.
1998); and Kenneth Laine Ketner, His Glassy Essence:
An Autobiography of Charles Sanders Peirce (Vanderbilt
University Press, 1998).
4. Harold Henderson, Catalyst for Controversy: Paul
Carus of Open Court, (Southern Illinois University
Press, 1993). The Open Court Publishing Company was
owned by the Chicago industrialist Edward C. Hegeler.
5. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 193
6. Peirce's book was completed but not published in
his lifetime. See notes 2-4 to selection 22 (p. 537).
7. Peirce's reviews appeared in the Nation and the Monist;
see P620 (CP 3.425-455), P627 (CN 2:132-33), and P637
(CP 3.456-552).
8. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 194.
9. This and the quotations that follow in this paragraph
are from the opening essay of William James, The Will
to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (Longmans
Green, 1896; Harvard University Press, 1979).
10. For Fisch's full account see Peirce, Semeiotic,
and Pragmatism, pp. 283 ff.
11. K. L. Ketner and H. Putnam speculate that James's
new-found interest in pragmatism, as well as "Royce's
drift toward Peirce's ideas," was a consequence
of Peirce's 1898 Cambridge Lectures (RLT 36).
12. Peirce's key anti-foundational arguments had appeared
earlier in his 1868 Journal of Speculative Philosophy
series; EP1, selections 2-4.
13. According to Murray Murphey, James's lecture put
Peirce "in an intolerable intellectual position."
Peirce could not now disown pragmatism, but neither
could he "embrace it without qualification."
Peirce had to come forward with his distinct views
(The Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp. 358-59).
14. See Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, ch. 4.
15. Quoted in Eisele's NEM 3:780.
16. This article, as reprinted in the Annual Report
of the Smithsonian Institution for Year Ending June
30, 1900 (Washington, D.C., 1901) is published in Philip
P. Wiener, ed., Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings
(Dover, 1966), pp. 265-74. Quotations are taken from
Wiener's book.
17. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 334
18. For an illustration of the logical depth of Peirce's
work for this book, see the chapters by Glenn Clark
and Shea Zellweger in Studies in the Logic of Charles
Sanders Peirce (Indiana University Press, 1997).
19. Peirce's application to the Carnegie Institution
(L 75) is available electronically on the Peirce-focused
website: http://www.door.net/ARISBE/arisbe.htm.
20. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 195.
21. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 365.
22. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 195.
23. See Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p.
365 and Richard S. Robin, "Classical Pragmatism
and Pragmatism's Proof" in The Rule of Reason:
The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Jacqueline
Brunning and Paul Forster, eds. (University of Toronto
Press, 1997), p. 149.
24. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 196.
25. See Fisch, "Peirce's Triadic Logic" (written
with Atwell Turquette) in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism,
pp. 171-83, for details and for further remarks on
triadic logic.
26. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 196.
27. According to Fisch (Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism,
p. 196), material (Philonian) implication was Peirce's
last nominalist stronghold.
28. James Jakób Liszka, A General Introduction
to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce (Indiana
University Press, 1996).
29. Peirce to C. J. Keyser, 10 April 1908 (Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, Columbia University).
30. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 363,
and Robin, "Classical Pragmatism and Pragmatism's
Proof," p. 149.
31. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 363.
32. Peirce to G. Papini, 10 April 1907 (Papini Archives).
33.Don D. Roberts, "An Introduction to Peirce's
Proof of Pragmatism," Transactions of the Charles
S. Peirce Society 14 (1978), p. 128.
34. See, for example, MS 300 and Roberts, "An Introduction
to Peirce's Proof of Pragmatism," p. 129, for
some elaboration.
35. Manley Thompson, The Pragmatic Philosophy of C.
S. Peirce (University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 249.
Robin, "Classical Pragmatism and Pragmatism's
Proof," p. 150.
36. See MS 640 and NEM 3:875; and Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic,
and Pragmatism, p. 196. Many manuscripts from Peirce's
last decade develop logic from the standpoint of semiotics
but, perhaps, none more fully than MS 693.
37. Quoted from a tribute solicited by Frederic Harold
Young and published by him in Charles Sanders Peirce;
America's Greatest Logician and Most Original Philosopher
(privately published, 1946), an address delivered in
October 1945 to the Pike County Historical Society
in Milford, Pennsylvania.
|