It had been evident for some time that an updated catalogue
of the Charles S. Peirce Papers was needed, one which
would survey the whole Collection, making as widely
available as possible a detailed statement of what
it contained and answering, so far as possible, the
questions scholars raise, including those about the
date of manuscripts and their relation to published
versions. Indeed the manuscripts and correspondence
are so voluminous and unwieldy that it is virtually
impossible for anyone to deal with them successfully
without benefit of the orientation which a catalogue
of the kind envisioned would provide. Moreover, as
the prospects of a microfilm edition of the Peirce
Papers increased, so did the need for an adequate catalogue,
which would reflect an orderly arrangement of the Papers
and assist the users of a microfilm edition.
The catalogue which was finally produced is imperfect.
It is imperfect because of the frequency of error in
what already has been done. More importantly, it is
imperfect because of what has not been done; that is,
much remains to be done by way of identifying and describing,
piecing together scattered fragments, assigning dates
to undated manuscripts and letters, and the like. But,
imperfect as this catalogue is, it is better than none
at all, and all of us who contributed to it recognized
that the needs for a comprehensive catalogue now outweighed
the advantages of indefinite delay.
ORGANIZATION OF THE CATALOGUE
As noted in the Preface, the Catalogue is divided into
two parts. The first part consists of manuscripts and
related material; the second part comprises the correspondence,
both Peirce's and the correspondence of others. The
organization of the correspondence presented no special
problems, but the organization of what may be called
the "subject matter" part of the Catalogue
was another story, and a brief word concerning the
problems encountered and the principle of organization
finally adopted is in order.
Of the two alternative ways of organizing a man's papers
chronologically and by content neither way, in spite
of the obvious advantages of each, was easily adapted
to the Peirce Collection. Consider the following problems.
If the decision is made to order by chronology, what
then does one do with the large quantity of undated
papers? (Less than half of the 1,644 catalogue entries
are dated and of the dates not supplied by Peirce
himself many are conjectural.) Moreover one would have
to expect that some of the material would be cut up
rather badly as in those instances where Peirce comments
on earlier articles. By virtue of temperament and other
needs, Peirce can be described as just as Henry James
had been an inveterate "revisionist." His
tendency to rework drafts of articles and books left
future editors of his manuscripts with the problem
of unscram-bling the various drafts, which, in some
cases, had been written years apart.
Consider now the problems resulting from a decision
to order the manuscripts by content. How does one handle
Peirce's many digressions? Even more significant perhaps
is the problem inherent in schemes that emphasize content;
namely, the risk one runs of either imposing too much
order or not enough order. Organization is rarely innocent,
and the greater the organization the greater the risk
that one's bias or interpretation will get in the way
of a clear presentation of what there is. However,
if one chooses to "play it safe" by arranging
the manuscripts as much as possible according to content,
thereby achieving a spectrum of sorts, and only then
drawing the lines at the more palpable breaks, the
results will tend to be nondescript. Finally, as was
pointed out to me, if an index were eventually prepared,
it would cancel out the need for ordering by content
in the first place.
A compromise between ordering by chronology and by content
seemed called for. But what compromise? One answer
was provided by Boler who, at one point, submitted
a plan to the Harvard Philosophy Depart-ment which
seemed perfectly reasonable and promising. His plan
in-volved six steps: (X) following Burks's bibliography
of Peirce's published works (Collected Papers, Vol.
VIII, pp. 260-321), locate and file the man-uscripts
for each entry; (2) place alternative drafts (and identifiable
fragments) with above; (3) from the remaining unpublished
material, file what is alike in content with above;
(4) also, some of the remaining material, especially
complete drafts and identifiable fragments, may be
filed chronologically; (5) whenever possible, arrange
what remains according to content; (6) finally, classify
the remainder of unidentifiable fragments as such.
Boler confessed that he became disillusioned about
the idea that Steps 3 and 4 would take care of the
bulk of the material. I too became disillusioned, and
for the reasons Boler gave. But my difficulties with
Boler's plan carried somewhat further.
Perhaps the decisive factor in the decision which was
ultimately made to compromise while emphasizing content
was the fact that the bulk of Peirce's philosophical
and other manuscripts the "Archives" material
had already been classified by content, in accordance
with a scheme adopted by McMahan. The "Houghton"
material which had been cata-logued independently by
Boler on the basis of some other scheme was from the
point of view of both quantity and quality far less
significant.
It was tempting, therefore, to adopt the McMahan catalogue,
with its principle of organization, incorporating the
"Houghton" material as best one could. In
this way, the manuscripts might be consolidated, but
even more important, since consolidation might be achieved
in other ways, was the amount of time and work that
could be saved.
The decision to adopt Peirce's own classification of
the sciences (which in effect, is what McMahan did)
was clearly a practical one, but only in part. Independently
there are good reasons for turning to Peirce's classi-ficatory
scheme. For one thing, it has the advantage of spreading
out Peirce's manuscripts in an orderly way without
making the results appear nondescript and without imposing
more order than is absolutely necessary. For another
thing, it is Peirce's scheme, not someone else's, concocted
for the occasion.
There are a number of accounts of Peirce's classificatory
scheme of the sciences. In brief, his classification
begins with the distinction between a theoretical and
a practical science, a distinction based upon the difference
of two interests the theoretical interest in attaining
knowledge for its own sake and the practical interest
in attaining knowledge for the sake of something else.
The theoretical branch of science is subdivided into
(a) the sciences of discovery and (b) the sciences
of review, with the latter dependent upon the former,
since review implies the review of something which,
in this case, is the information provided by the various
sciences of discovery. Indeed, Peirce's own studies
in classification are subsumed under (b), as one might
expect.
Although Peirce did classify the practical sciences,
he was chiefly con-cerned with the theoretical ones,
especially those which fell under the heading "sciences
of discovery" or, in other places, "sciences
of research," and it is his classificatory scheme
for those sciences which turned out to be most useful
for our purposes. Below is one of several tabular listings
from Peirce's papers.*
MATHEMATICS
PHILOSOPHY
Phenomenology, or Ideoscopy
Normative Science
Esthetics
Ethics
Logic
Speculative Grammar
Critic
Methodeutic
Metaphysics
IDIOSCOPY, or SPECIAL SCIENCE
Physics
Nomological Physics
Classificatory Physics
Descriptive Physics
Psychics
Nomological Psychics [Psychology]
Classificatory Psychics [Ethnology]
Descriptive Psychics [History]
* This particular list is taken from a manuscript placed
with the Matthew Mattoon Curtis correspondence (L107).
The manuscript is an incomplete draft of a philosophical
autobiography prepared in response to Curtis's request
for information concerning Peirce's logical and philosophical
views. For a more complete account of Peirce's classificatory
scheme for the sciences, see Collected Papers, Vol.
I, pp. 75-137. For a good summary account, see Thomas
Goudge, The Thought of C. S. Peirce (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 1950) pp. 44-50.
The above listing is for the sciences of discovery (research)
only. It should also be clear that the listing is incomplete,
for it fails to give the subdivisions of mathematics,
metaphysics, and the idioscopic sciences, especially
the last with its elaborate arrangement of suborders,
families, and subfamilies.
The listing also fails to indicate the hierarchical
character of Peirce's classificatory scheme. For Peirce,
the sciences listed first are independent of those
listed later. Or, if you like, when borrowing occurs,
each science tends to borrow from those sciences which
precede it in the classification. Thus, for example,
in the case of the subdivisions of logic, methodeutic
rests upon both critic and speculative grammar, critic
upon speculative grammar alone vis a vis the divisions
of logic, and speculative grammar upon neither, but
only upon those sciences (ethics, esthetics, phenomenology,
mathematics) which precede it in the hierarchy. Or,
more generally, the mathematician, as such, working
independently of the other scientists, seeking formal,
not material, truth, traces out the necessary consequences
of hypotheses which others, to be sure, may posit.
Philosophy (all branches) is dependent upon mathematics,
but takes precedence over all the special sciences,
which follow it in the hierarchical scheme.
If one examines my table of contents, and observes the
order in which Peirce's papers are catalogued, one
will note the Catalogue's general adherence to Peirce's
classificatory scheme. The Catalogue lists Peirce's
mathematical works first, and attempts to deal with
these works along the lines suggested by Peirce's division
of mathematics into the mathe-matics of logic, of discrete
series, of continua and pseudo-continua. The items
listed toward the end textbooks, recreations, computations
and fragments are conveniently placed there, and have
nothing to do with the classificatory scheme for mathematics.
If one ignores pragmatism the next major division of
the manuscripts following mathematics and concentrates
on the other divisions (phe-nomenology, logic, metaphysics,
physics, chemistry, astronomy, geodesy, psychology,
linguistics, history, sciences of review, practical
science), especially the order in which they occur
in the Catalogue, one ought to observe that the remainder
of the Catalogue follows Peirce's classificatory scheme,
although this may not be self-evident with respect
to some of the divisions Why, for example, does chemistry
precede astronomy, both in Peirce's scheme and in my
catalogue? The reason is that chemistry falls under
classificatory physics whereas astronomy falls under
descriptive physics, and classificatory physics takes
precedence over descriptive physics in Peirce's scheme.
Again: Why does linguistics take precedence over history?
The answer is that linguistics falls under classificatory
psychics, and history, as already indicated, falls
under descriptive psychics. Since classificatory psychics
precedes descriptive psychics in Peirce's account,
linguistics takes precedence over history.
This is not to say that I have slavishly followed Peirce's
scheme for the classification of the sciences. As a
matter of fact, a rigid adherence to Peirce's scheme
is neither required nor desirable. I have followed
the scheme only so far as it proved to be advantageous
to do so; I have de-parted from it whenever I concluded
that by adhering to it the presen-tation of the Peirce
material would be hampered Indeed, if one observes
closely the organization of this catalogue, one will
observe the many liberties taken with Peirce's classificatory
scheme, with perhaps the major liberty taken with respect
to the manuscripts on pragmatism.
Pragmatism, as a division or heading, presents a special
problem. As things stand, given Peirce's classificatory
scheme, the manuscripts on pragmatism are out of order.
They ought to be in closer proximity than they are
now to the logical manuscripts. Pragmatism clearly
cuts across the divisions of logic, and perhaps ought
to have been subsumed under logic, that is, under one
or more of its divisions. After all, did not Peirce
come to the view that pragmatism is the logic of abduction?
The justification for its present position in the Catalogue,
as a separate division between mathematics and phenomenology,
rests on the desire not to bury pragmatism among the
manuscripts on logic, because of the general im-portance
of pragmatism in Peirce's thought and of the lecture
series or series of articles of which many of the manuscripts
form an integral part.
There are other kinds of problems. One kind concerns
the gaps in the Catalogue. To cite one example, Peirce's
classificatory scheme calls for the ethnology of social
development, one of the sciences comprising one of
the many subdivisions of psychical science. The fact
that there is no place or listing for it in the Catalogue
means simply that none of the manuscripts of Peirce
are concerned specifically with the ethnology of social
development.
More serious, perhaps, is the failure of this catalogue
to provide separate listings for, say, ethics or speculative
grammar. But here the problem was not one of finding
manuscripts which dealt specifically with ethical problems
or the issues of speculative grammar. Indeed there
are many such manuscripts. The problem was frequently
that of separating units of larger works lecture series
or series of articles or chapters in a proposed book
something which this editor was reluctant to do. In
such cases, the descriptions attached to catalogue
entries and the general index are counted on to direct
the reader's attention to subject matter for which
the Catalogue provides no separate heading or listing.
Then there is the other kind of problem one runs into
when dealing with classificatory schemes generally
the problem of how to classify this or that relative
to the scheme with which one is working. For example,
does this manuscript fall under logic or mathematics?
Does that manuscript belong with the manuscripts on
pragmatism or somewhere else? Often it is not a simple
matter to decide, especially when Peirce digresses
and when the digression becomes the most significant
feature of the manuscript. Sometimes, usually in the
case of notebooks, two quite different articles are
begun, which forces the editor to decide their relative
importance, with the ever present possibility of judgmental
error. When confronted with problems of this kind,
I have again counted on my descriptions to call attention
to anomalies and the general index to bring similar
but widely separated material together.
Finally, there are the outright mistakes. One of these
will serve as an example. There is no excuse for separating
MSS. 314 and 316, since MS. 316 continues MS. 314.
In this case the error was discovered only after the
microfilming of the manuscripts was completed. Undoubtedly
there are errors of this and other sorts which have
yet to be discovered. Work on the Catalogue proceeded
on the expectation that errors, both of commission
and omission, would be made; it also proceeded in the
hope that these errors, when discovered, would be reported
and collected, and then, in one way or another, made
available to users of this catalogue.
THE FORM OF THE CATALOGUE
The manuscript portion of the Catalogue differs from
the correspondence portion with respect to the form
employed in presenting the relevant information concerning
each entry. For the manuscript portion, each entry
is presented in an arrangement of six or seven parts:
1. Title
2. Abbreviated title (Mark)
3. Type of material, whether manuscript, typescript,
reprint, or other
4. Publication
5. Date
6. Pagination
7. Description of content
In the Catalogue, Parts 1 and 2 (title) are separated
from Parts 3-6 (physical description) which in turn
are separated from Part 7 (description of content).
Peirce's titles are presented without brackets or parentheses,
just as they appear in the manuscripts. Title page
punctuation is retained and the original spellings
have been preserved in all titles without the use of
sic to indicate deviations from the norm.
The use of brackets indicates that the title has been
supplied by the editor. It goes without saying that
when a title has been supplied, it is always in the
absence of one provided by Peirce, either because he
never provided one or because the title page is missing.
In defense of supplying titles may I say that it serves
as a convenient way of noting a manuscript's principal
content and, in many cases, the supplied title as a
brief description of the contents saves space by enabling
us to dispense with a formal description at the end.
May I also add that the supplied titles are sometimes
less misleading than the titles which Peirce himself
gives. Although Peirce's titles no doubt acquaint us
with his intentions, do they also acquaint us with
the manuscript's contents? Certainly not in those cases
where the manuscript progresses only a few pages and
where Peirce's introductory reflections have little
or nothing to do with the title. Or, where the manuscript
digresses from the topic indicated by the title, and
the digression is the manuscript's distinctive feature.
A large number of Peirce's manuscripts have no title,
but some of these possess a mark which is most often
found in the upper left-hand corner of the manuscript
page. When the mark occurs in conjunction with a title,
it frequently stands for a short or abbreviated form
of the title. It becomes a matter for conjecture when
there is a mark but no title. In any event the occurrence
of a mark is indicated by the use of parentheses. When
the manuscript possesses both a title and a mark, the
procedure is to record the title first and the mark
in parentheses second. When the manuscript possesses
only the mark, then the mark, distin-guished from the
title by the use of parentheses, serves in place of
the title.
In the next parts (3-6) I was concerned with identifying
the type of material, whether a manuscript or typescript,
or reprint, or book, or page proof, or galley proof,
or the like. I was also concerned with whether, in
the case of typescripts, reprints, books, and proofs,
there was any annotation or correction.
Most of the manuscripts were not published. But where
publication had occurred this is noted by reference
to Burks's bibliography and Fisch's two supplements.
For an explanation of both Burks's and Fisch's manner
of handling bibliographical references, see my explanations
of conventions on p. xxvii f. The Catalogue notes whether
a manuscript was published in full or in part, and
where publication was in part only, precisely what
part was published. The only exception to notification
of publication occurs in those cases where a part,
or even the whole of a manuscript, was published as
part of another author's publication. For example,
MS. 620 was published as an appendix to one of Fisch's
articles on Peirce,* but there is no indication of
this publication in the description of MS. 620. This
happens to be a significant publication, but, in other
cases, it was difficult to say what was and was not
significant, and it did not seem worthwhile to mention
every publication of this kind.
When not placed within brackets or qualified in any
other way, the given date is Peirce's. As a rule one
date is given and this is the date which is usually
recorded on the title page or, in the case of some
note-books, on the cover. Most often it is the only
date. But where several dates are given, the range
of dates is noted in the description.
When the date is placed in brackets, then the date,
as in the case of titles, has been supplied by someone
other than Peirce. Whereas I supplied the titles, various
persons at different times and with varying degrees
of confidence supplied the dates. When the date is
placed in brackets without any other qualifying mark,
then it is presumed to be accurate, derived from reliable
internal evidence. A date preceded by "c."
is presumed to be an accurate central locus of possible
dates. A date followed by a question mark is frankly
a "best guess," based on some internal evidence.
When the expression "n.d." occurs, it means
that for the moment not even a good guess can be made.
The pagination of a manuscript is indicated by two forms,
for example, either pp. 1-5 or 5 pp. The first form
signifies that the manuscript was numbered by Peirce;
the second form gives the editor's count. One difficulty
in determining a true page count rests with Peirce's
habit of using the verso of a page of manuscript for
calculations or other notes which may or may not be
related to the manuscript in question. The question
of whether to count a page or not sometimes proved
difficult and left room for judgmental error. For additional
information concerning pagination, see the guide to
the use and consultation of the microfilm edition of
the Peirce Papers, prepared by the Harvard University
Microreproduction Service, which is reproduced in the
next section of this introduction.
* See Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce,
Second Series, edited by Moore and Robin, University
of Massachusetts Press, 1964, pp. 24-29.
In 1915, a few of the manuscripts had become separated
from the main Peirce Collection. These were added to
the general manuscript collection of the Harvard University
Library. They were catalogued separately, each with
its own call number. Now that they have been restored
to the Peirce Collection, their old call numbers have
been added to the description for the purpose of identifying
them.
In the interest of economy the content descriptions
(Part 7) have been pared down to the bare essentials
necessary for a clear indication of what there is.
The descriptions tend to be topical rather than critical,
serving more the function of an index than an analytical
table of contents. Not all entries have descriptions,
although bracketed titles are intended in all cases
to emphasize the principal content of the manuscript.
For the most part Peirce's own titles serve the same
function. When they do not, a formal description is
indicated and provided. But, in general, descriptions
are provided for the important entries only, except
where the lack of a description means either that,
in the case of a draft of a complete or more refined
version, the manuscript in question says nothing not
already contained in the description of that later
or refined version or contains no additional information
which in the judgment of the editor is worth special
notice. In any event the reader should take note of
the number of pages of manuscript. If they are few,
the topic or topics indicated by the title or by the
formal description may not be very well developed.
Throughout the manuscript portion of the Catalogue,
although occurring infrequently, are entry numbers
for which there are no manuscripts, as distinct from
those entries where a manuscript exists but is missing.
These "holes" were created by the fast that
the manuscripts which were originally there have been
recombined with other manuscripts and that this was
done after the completion of the microfilming. Rather
than renumber, the entry numbers were retained, but
left blank. The "holes" may even have a use
someday. They might conveniently serve as the means
of slipping new Peirce material into the collection,
if such material is ever uncovered.
The correspondence constitutes the last portion of the
Catalogue and is divided into four parts: the Charles
S. Peirce correspondence, which contains all of Peirce's
letters, both those he wrote and those he received;
the Juliette Peirce correspondence, which contains
all of Juliette Peirce's correspondence, except such
correspondence as involves Peirce jointly and which
was, for this reason, placed with his correspondence;
the family correspondence, which consists of correspondence
among members of Peirce's family but which does not
involve Peirce or his wife Juliette directly; and miscellaneous
correspondence.
The form adopted for the correspondence is the simplest
possible one. For the Charles S. Peirce correspondence,
the correspondents are listed alphabetically, the number
of letters and letter drafts noted, and, when these
are dated, the dates recorded, except when more than
three of them are involved and when more than three
are dated, in which case only the first and last dates
are given. Where dates were lacking, an attempt was
made to supply them, the procedure here being the same
as for the manuscripts. Supplied dates appear in brackets,
with or without "c." and with or without
question marks. The remaining parts of the correspondence
follow the form of the first part.
The division of the Catalogue into two parts manuscripts
(or, as sometimes represented, subject matter) and
correspondence is a bit misleading insofar as it suggests
that no correspondence is to be found in the first
part and nothing which is classifiable as subject matter
is to be found in the second part. On the contrary,
an occasional letter draft may be found among the manuscripts;
these were filmed with the manuscripts and all but
those which appear on the versos of manuscript pages
were subsequently placed with the correspondence, once
it became clear that they belonged there. Not all of
Peirce's correspondence is personal and business correspondence.
There is much which can be described as professional,
so much so that if the first few pages and the last
were set aside, the remainder could easily be mistaken
for manuscript material. Indeed, this is the principal
reason why some correspondence was originally placed
with the manuscripts.
Finally, a word about the four appendices. Appendix
I is a supplement to my catalogue descriptions necessitated
by certain discrepancies between the descriptions and
what is contained in the microfilm edition of the Peirce
Papers. (See the following section of this introduction
for an explanation of the discrepancies and the manner
of handling them.) Appendix II is a chronological listing
of Peirce's manuscripts. It is hoped that this listing
can be expanded some day, as scholars are able to date
more of Peirce's manuscripts. Appendices III and IV
are cross-reference tables. Appendix III is a cross-reference
table from Burks's bibliography to my catalogue entries
and Appendix IV, from McMahan's catalogue to mine.
Anyone who so desires can set out from the Collected
Papers and reach my catalogue entries through the intermediary
of Burks's bibliog-raphy. See Burks's cross-reference
index, pp. 325-330 of Vol. VIII of the Collected Papers.
THE MICROFILM EDITION
Two Peirce projects cataloguing and microfilming were
linked almost from the beginning. The need for a new
catalogue was evident; but so was the need to microfilm
Peirce's manuscripts and correspondence, for the physical
condition of Peirce's papers was a matter of grave
concern. Although the entire collection is now kept
in the Houghton Library, where temperature and air
control give the papers the best chance for survival,
it was feared that even with slightly more handling,
given normal wear and tear, the deterioration of the
papers would be rapid and alarming. With interest in
Peirce mounting and with the expectation that the demand
for consulting his papers would most likely increase
in the years ahead, it was urged that steps be taken
to microfilm them, or at least as much of them as there
were funds for.
The success of the microfilming project depended in
part on achieving a new arrangement of the Peirce Papers,
one which would incorporate the efforts of the past,
but would yield a single numerical sequence. With the
present catalogue, the numbered sequence was achieved.
This permitted the microfilming of Peirce's manuscripts,
with all of its advantages of preserving the original
manuscript collection from the wear and tear of handling,
of providing a record which might serve in place of
any parts of the collection that might from time to
time be lost, stolen, or destroyed, and finally of
making the manuscripts readily available to scholars
in all parts of the world.
There are some discrepancies between what was microfilmed
and my catalogue descriptions. These are few considering
the number of catalogue entries and the principal reason
that there are any at all is that errors were discovered
in the Catalogue before it was printed but only after
the microfilming of the manuscripts was completed.
Apart from a major change or two and some minor ones,
the microfilm was left un-touched, mainly because of
the expense involved in any extensive alteration. An
asterisk placed before the catalogue entry number of
the manuscript indicates that a discrepancy exists
and directs attention to Appendix I "A Supplement
to the Catalogue Descriptions."
A short guide to the use and consultation of the microfilm
edition was prepared by the Harvard University Library
Microreproduction Service in the Fall of 1964. For
the benefit of those who will be working with the film
and for the additional information concerning the manuscripts
themselves, I reproduce the guide here.
This microfilm possesses some apparently anomalous features
with which the reader ought to be acquainted to facilitate
its use. The major part of the film's unusual features
originates in the author's manner of composition.
First it was the author's usual practice to write on
one side only of the paper. Less than 5% of the material
in this microfilm contained writing on the verso of
the page. In the notebooks, Peirce usually wrote only
on the recto pages; accordingly, to spare unnecessary
expense, only those pages of the notebooks actually
bearing text have been filmed. This accounts for the
fact that notebooks appear to have been filmed in irregular
fashion, sometimes as a single spread and sometimes
as a double spread. A similar situation prevails with
the material written on loose sheets. In a few instances,
both with the notebooks and the loose sheets, Peirce
used the opposite sides to make routine calculations,
some related and some unrelated to the main body of
the work. In most instances, these routine calculations
have not been filmed. Where there was doubt about routineness
or where the calculations were other than ordinary
arithmetic, such material was microfilmed. Some of
these data may thus appear to interrupt the normal
sequence of the manuscript.
Another unusual feature concerns pagination. The manuscripts
fol-low four schemes of pagination: (X) unpaged, (2)
either even-numbered or odd-numbered, (3) normal, and
(4) iterated pagination. The re-peated pagination almost
always occurs in the notebooks when Peirce was constructing
a draft If he was dissatisfied with his first draft
of page 1, he would go on to the next page, number
it also "page 1,'' and continue with his revision
until satisfied that he could carry on with page 2,
and so on It is not uncommon for a page number to be
thus repeated for four or five consecutive drafts before
the next sequential number.
Odd-numbered pagination only is common in the notebooks.
Evi-dently this was Peirce's way of indicating his
consciousness that he was using only the rectos, or
perhaps he was saving the versos for cor-rections or
changes. In a few instances, an explanatory target
accom-panies each frame of film and states that no
pages are missing.
Unpaged material has been placed in sequence insofar
as this was ascertainable by the editors, and, of course,
insofar as the actual pages were available.
At the end of a numbered sequence of pages, there will
occasionally be found a miscellany of pages consisting
of broken runs or isolated pages surviving from other
drafts.
Another unusual condition arises from Peirce's practice
of starting some notebooks from the front, and upon
reaching the center, turning the notebook upside down
and beginning anew from the "back." Sometimes
the separate contents of such notebooks may be unrelated
although they occupy the same physical and bibliographic
unit; in other instances, after the notebook was turned
upside down, the same material was continued. This
condition prevails in little used as well as in full
notebooks. Rather than inconvenience the reader of
the film with upside down images or reversed pages
sequences, all such material has been filmed for normal
reading sequence. In each case a notice explaining
this situation is filmed at the beginning, the center,
and the "end" of the item.
Peirce occasionally constructed from paper a physical
device to be removed from a notebook and manipulated.
An example is a dough-nut-like device he constructed
to elucidate a point in topology. In filming devices,
a first exposure has been made with the device in place,
a second with the device removed, and if necessary
for clarity, a third of the device itself.
Printed editorial forms used in connection with the
partial publi-cation of this material by the Harvard
University Press in the Col-lected Papers have remained
with the collection, and it is possible that a few
of these may have been accidentally incorporated into
the micro-film. These are of course not a part of the
collection and should be ignored.
POSTSCRIPT
Generally speaking, a catalogue of a man's writing stands
as an impersonal record of his achievement. Standing
alone it seems to cry out for some kind of personal
statement, a portrait of sorts, which would complement
the impersonal record. Of course it is a matter of
conjecture as to what kind of personal statements or
portrait of himself Peirce would have appreciated.
In the introduction to a catalogue a panegyric seems
somehow out of place. Perhaps it would be best to let
the catalogue speak for itself. The display of prodigious
intellectuality, creative genius, philosophic and scientific
integrity, demonstrated therein, and, for one who knows
something of the frustrations and deprivations of Peirce's
personal and professional life, the sense of tragedy
that pervades the whole seem to me to be intellectually
stimulating and, at times, profoundly moving.