165.title A Guess at the Riddle] It is commonly assumed that Peirce chose the title on account of Emerson's famous poem "The Sphinx," some verses of which he frequently quoted. But there is no convincing evidence that Peirce wanted to make a specific allusion to Emerson or anyone else. That the title might refer to F. C. S. Schiller's Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism must be ruled out since that book was only published in May 1891. Other candidates are Francis E. Abbot and Peirce's father Benjamin (see W5:xli-xlii). It is clear that Peirce did not need any special source of inspiration to come up with his title, as the metaphor was culturally well established. What is the riddle? A clue is suggested by the fact that Peirce had engrossed himself in the study of presocratic thinkers for one or two years, as manifested in R 1574: 217-19 (see ann. 181.4-5) and in "One, Two, Three" (W5:294-98, 1886), where Peirce compares his own research with that of the first Greek philosophers on "primal matter." The riddle Peirce tries to guess at is substantially the same: "What is the world made of?" (W5:295). The last chapter, "The Triad in Physics," gives the answer (sel. 28, 208.29-31). On how much of a guess it is, see sel. 25, 182.3-6.

166.title [ Contents ]] This table of contents is remarkably close to the outline given in "One, Two Three," W5:294-98 (1886), with which it ought to be compared.

166.1 One, Two, Three. Already written.] This refers, not to the actual first chapter printed in this volume (it was written later than the table of contents), but to sel. 35 or (a more developed form of) one of the chapters in sels. 47-50 in W5, which were all intended for the projected book "One, Two, Three."

166.2 Chapter 2. . . . Not touched.] Although Peirce probably never wrote this chapter, its substance can be deduced from the five papers referred to (and identified in the next five annotations). For this chapter, the Collected Papers editors used part of R 901 (CP 1.369-72; published in W5:242-47, 1885).

166.3 my last paper] "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" (1885), W5:162-90, especially 162-65.

166.5 my paper on a new list of categories] "On a New List of Categories" (1867), W2:49-59, especially 56-59.

166.6-7 my paper in Studies in Logic.] "A Theory of Probable Inference" (1883), W4:408-50, especially 408-23.

166.8 my paper on the classification of arguments.] "On the Natural Classification of Arguments" (1867), W2:23-48, especially 29-42.

166.9-10 my first paper on the logic of relatives.] "Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives" (1870), W2:359-429, especially 364-66.

166.11-15 The dual . . . numerical quantity.] See "Segment 4" of "Notes on the Categories" (W5:240-41, 1885), which expresses the same idea more fully.

166.18-19 dual quantity . . . Boolian algebra,] See for instance W5:382.

167.7 pneumatology.] CD 4574: "2. The branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and operations of mind or spirit, or a treatise on it." This is followed by a quotation from William Hamilton: "The terms Psychology and Pneumatology, or Pneumatic, are not equivalent. The latter word was used for the doctrine of spirit in general, which was subdivided into three branches, as it treated of the three orders of spiritual substances--God, Angels and Devils, and Man." Under pneumatic philosophy, Peirce gives the following definition: "the science of metaphysics or psychology; pneumatology."

167.8 consciousness is a sort of public spirit] Compare with R 954:12-13 (c. 1892):

Such is a slight outline of some of the features of the philosophy which I am persuaded will soon be recognized as that which is the most in harmony with the methods and discoveries of physical science. I have not developed its psychological side, because that part of it is difficult of apprehension. I must however mention that according to this everything is of the nature of the mind,--even material phenomena. But mind is not necessarily person. A person is mind whose parts are coordinated in a particular way. Something of the general nature of personality there is in all general ideas. These conceptions are in a certain sense creations of the human intelligence; but in another aspect the human mind is the creation of these conceptions working together. These general conceptions are no figments, they are real things,--more than that, they are living beings with something like life and something like personality. Mind acts upon mind by virtue of its continuity; and this continuity involves generality. In regard to the concerns of the soul, religion, immortality, morality, the synechistic philosophy, as I call it, that is the philosophy of continuity, leaves all such questions to the jury to be decided according to the evidence.

167.11 Chapter 9. The triad in theology.] See Peirce's 1885 review of Royce's The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, W5:221-34, especially 229.

167.11-12 Faith . . . without flinching.] In his "Peirce's Arisbe" paper (Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, p. 234), Max Fisch wrote by way of explanation:

The clue is in the address on "Design and Chance," where [Peirce] chides even Epicurus for flinching, by exempting his gods from the absolute chance that gives rise to his infinite worlds. For he places his gods in the spaces between the worlds and rests their divinity on the fineness of the atoms that compose them. "Thus, divineness comes from a special cause & does not originate by chance from elements not containing it. Darwin's view is nearer to mine. Indeed my opinion is only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, and brought into the realm of Ontology" (W4:552).